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Abstract
In assessing the desirability for tax decentralization reforms, a dilemma between
efficiency and redistribution emerges. By limiting the ability of the central govern-
ment to redistribute resources towards regions in financial needs, decentralization
curbs incentives for excessive subnational spending and enhances fiscal discipline,
but may also widen interregional disparities by triggering tax competition for mobile
tax bases. We provide a formal treatment of this trade-off, and shed light on the opti-
mal degree of fiscal decentralization. We find that tax decentralization can be optimal
even under Rawlsian social preferences which only weight the welfare of the poorest
region in the federation.
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1 Introduction
In the unitary state of Chile, fiscal decentralization reforms—broadly defined as the de-
volution of tax and expenditure powers to subnational governments—rank high in the
policy agenda.1 At the same time, this country has one of the highest degrees of regional
disparities among the OECD world.2 Should Chile’s regional configuration be regarded
as a case for or against decentralization policies?
This paper aims to contribute to these sorts of discussions. We do so by focusing on
a common dilemma between efficiency and redistribution when assessing the desirabil-
ity for decentralization reforms. On the one hand, by limiting the ability of the central
government to redistribute resources towards regions in financial needs, decentralization
curbs incentives for excessive subnational spending and enhances fiscal discipline (see,
e.g., Qian and Roland (1998)). On the other hand, by triggering tax competition for mo-
bile tax bases, decentralized systems may widen interregional disparities. In a famous
essay, Re´my Prud’homme puts forward this distributional issue:3
”Is a decentralized system likely to be more effective at reducing interjurisdictional
disparities than a centralized system? The answer is no. (A decentralized system) is
likely to induce a vicious circle; richer jurisdictions will have large tax bases (whatever
tax bases are chosen), with tax rates that are either the same or lower than other, less
rich jurisdictions. In the first instance, they will collect more taxes and therefore will
be able to provide more local public services. In the second, they will offer the same
services at lower tax rates. In both cases, these localities will be preferred by businesses
and households, which will choose to settle there, enlarging the tax base and increasing
the gap in income between regions. Decentralization can therefore be the mother of
segregation.” (Prud’homme (1995), p. 203)
In this paper we provide a formal treatment of this trade-off balancing equity and
efficiency and, through those lens, we shed light on the optimal degree of fiscal decen-
tralization. Our main result is that fiscal decentralization, despite increasing regional
1For example, president Bachelet’s second administration (2014-2018) put forward a “Decentralization
Agenda” aiming at transferring power to lower level governments (see https://chile.gob.cl/ocde).
2In 2013, the level of regional GDP concentration in Chile was the second highest in the OECD. See
OECD (2017).
3Empirical evidence on the impact of fiscal decentralization on regional disparities is mixed (see
Martinez-Vazquez et al. (2017) for a survey). For example, Rodrı´guez-Pose and Gill (2004) find a positive
link between decentralization and regional divergence, while Lessmann (2012) and Kyriacou et al. (2015)
argue that the sign of the effect depends on the level of economic development and on government quality,
respectively.
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disparities, can be optimal even under Rawlsian social preferences which only weight the
welfare of the poorest region in the federation. Accordingly, the inherent inefficiencies
of centralization may dwarf one of the key “dangers” of decentralization articulated by
Prud’homme (1995).
We develop a model of a federation with benevolent governments at all levels, i.e.,
central and regional. The federation is composed of two regions which are heterogeneous
across their capital endowment: the “rich” region has a larger capital endowment than the
“poor” region. Capital serves as the tax base, and it is imperfectly mobile across regions.
Regional governments decide upon the provision of a binary local public good, or project.
If the project is initiated, it may or may not require an additional round of financing to
be completed. Each regional government has just enough resources to initiate a local
project, but needs additional tax revenue—either from local tax collections or from the
central government—if the project is to be refinanced. In this sense, public expenditure is
already fully decentralized, and our analysis concentrates on whether taxation authority
should be decentralized or not.4
We consider two institutional regimes, tax decentralization and tax centralization, de-
pending on whether regional governments or the central authority make the decision
on refinancing projects.5 Under tax decentralization, each regional government decides
upon continuing projects in financial needs by raising local capital taxes. Under tax cen-
tralization, instead, the central government decides whether or not to bailout incomplete
projects by means of a uniform national capital tax.
Our model formalizes the aforementioned trade-off between interregional inequal-
ity and efficiency of subnational spending. Namely, tax centralization dampens regional
disparities, but can lead to overprovision of local projects. Tax decentralization, in con-
trast, amplifies the gap between the rich and the poor region, but eliminates excessive
local spending. Additionally, our model singles out other types of inefficiencies emerging
from the decentralized regime. That is, local projects can in fact be underprovided with
respect to the first best, and initiated projects are subject to refinancing distortions and
deadweight losses associated with tax competition.
We focus on how the optimal regime choice is shaped by the interplay of three funda-
mentals: the difference in initial capital endowments across regions, the social aversion
to interregional inequalities, and the probability of experiencing a refinancing shock. The
4Our focus on tax decentralization is motivated by the fact that tax autonomy is much less decentralized
than expenditure authority in the data. See, e.g., OECD/KIPF (2016).
5Brueckner (2009) refers to these regimes as full and partial decentralization, respectively.
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first two parameters drive, respectively, the degree of ex ante interregional disparities,
and the social welfare weight on regional convergence. The third parameter determines
the expected completion time of a project and, thus, the likelihood with which centraliza-
tion and decentralization generate different outcomes ex post (recall that the rules of our
decentralization regimes only differ at the refinancing stage).
The analysis starts by characterizing the optimal regime under a utilitarian criterion,
and over the entire range of refinancing shock probabilities. Two major results are drawn.
First, small initial disparities can favor tax decentralization vis-a`-vis centralization. Essen-
tially, thanks to a larger tax base, a higher capital endowment in the hands of the rich
region allows it to lower tax distortions in its jurisdiction. We show that, for low levels
of regional heterogeneity, this effect is first-order relative to other distortions, and makes
expected welfare under tax decentralization increasing in the degree of regional dispar-
ities. Second, large disparities do not necessarily eliminate decentralization optimality.
We pin down a plausible necessary and sufficient condition for that to be the case, which
is tied to the relative net expected return on initiated projects under each regime in the
poor region.
We then evaluate the optimal regime choice under different welfare criteria. Since
tax centralization reduces ex ante inequalities, higher social aversion for interregional
disparities typically favors tax centralization over decentralization (all else equal). But
somewhat paradoxically, even a Rawlsian planner would adopt the decentralized regime
under some conditions. More precisely, as long as regions are relatively homogeneous
and the refinancing probability is high enough, tax decentralization dominates for any
welfare criterion, including one which only weights welfare of the poorest region in the
federation.
The reason for this result is twofold. First, a high probability of refinancing brings
down the net expected return of a local project. Hence, overinvestment inefficiencies un-
der centralization are severe relative to underinvestment issues under decentralization.
Second, when regions are sufficiently homogeneous, the poor region would need to fund
a large fraction of central bailouts, while facing small tax competition distortions (as re-
gions levy similar tax rates). Therefore, small disparities also favor the decentralized
regime from the perspective of the poor.
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Related Literature. Our paper contributes to the vast theoretical literature on optimal
fiscal federalism initated by Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972).6 Recent strands of this lit-
erature studied how different types of interregional externalities shape the optimal allo-
cation of tax and expenditure powers across government levels. For example, Lockwood
(2002) and Besley and Coate (2003) focus on the role of interregional spillovers, while
Janeba and Wilson (2011) and Hatfield and Padro´ i Miquel (2012) look at fiscal external-
ities associated with tax competition. In this paper, the optimal degree of decentraliza-
tion is determined by the social concern for regional disparities, and by the inefficiencies
emerging from two types of externalities: tax competition (under tax decentralization)
and a common pool fiscal externality due to central bailouts (under tax centralization).7
Moreover, differently from the works just cited, we study optimal tax rather than expen-
diture decentralization, and we provide a purely normative contribution by abstracting
from political economy constraints.
Technically, our model builds on Bellofatto and Besfamille (2018), where we study the
optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in the presence of regional state capacity imper-
fections. Three main differences are worth highlighting. First, in this paper we introduce
interregional heterogeneity. Second, here we consider a richer normative criteria that ex-
plicitly accounts for equity considerations. Third, we abstract from regional state capacity
imperfections to focus on the impact of regional disparities on the optimal decentraliza-
tion regime.
By featuring potential bailouts from the central government, this paper also relates to
the literature on the optimality of soft vs. hard budget constraints in federations, includ-
ing Qian and Roland (1998), Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2004), and Besfamille and Lockwood (2008),
among others. All of these works focus on environments with identical regions.
Our paper also connects with the literature on asymmetric capital tax competition, fol-
lowing the line of the seminal contributions of Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991).8 A
central result in those papers is the so-called “advantage of smallness.” Namely, “small”
regions levy lower taxes than “large” regions in equilibrium, which ultimately leads to
higher welfare for the residents of the small region. One notable difference with Bucovet-
sky (1991) and Wilson (1991) is that regional asymmetries in those works come from dif-
ferences in population sizes, and not from differences in capital endowments per capita as
in this paper (for this reason, we prefer employing the “rich-poor” rather than the “large-
6See Oates (1999) for a survey.
7See Wildasin (1997) and Goodspeed (2002).
8Wilson (1999) provides a thorough survey of the tax competition literature.
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small” taxonomy).9 DePater and Myers (1994) and Peralta and van Ypersele (2005) con-
sider capital tax competition environments in which regions not only differ across popu-
lation sizes, but also across capital endowments per resident. A central feature of these
models is the presence of a “pecuniary externality” (or “terms of trade effect”) through
which regions can manipulate the price of capital. In our environment, though, such
pecuniary externality is absent because the marginal productivity of capital is constant.
Another key difference with the bulk of the literature on tax competition is that, in
our framework, public expenditure does not adjust residually. Rather, the level of public
spending is fixed at the tax competition stage. Hence, when regions engage in tax compe-
tition in our model, the poor region ends up setting a higher tax rate than the rich, simply
because the tax base of the latter is larger. This rationalizes the mechanism hypothesized
by Prud’homme (1995), which goes against the “advantage of smallness” result.10
Finally, Cai and Treisman (2005) show that regional competition (over infrastructure
spending and taxes) to attract mobile capital can exacerbate initial disparities across re-
gions. Janeba and Todtenhaupt (2018) evaluate how such polarization effect is influenced
by the levels of initial government debt. Unlike in those papers, we compare the relative
merits of centralized and decentralized regimes.
Layout of the paper. The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2
lays out the model. In Sections 3 and 4 we focus the tax centralization and the tax decen-
tralization regimes, respectively, by analyzing equilibrium outcomes and inefficiencies
under each regime. Section 5 characterizes the optimal regime, Section 6 presents numer-
ical simulations of the model, and Section 7 concludes. Most proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Preliminaries
The economy lasts for four periods, t = {0, 1, 2, 3}, and is composed of two regions in-
dexed by ` ∈ {p, r}. Each region is populated by a representative agent, or resident,
9In the recent work of Mongrain and Wilson (2018), regional size differences are driven by the number
of domestic firms ex ante. The authors focus on the relative merits of preferential tax treatment of different
types of firms.
10Similarly, Itaya et al. (2008) find that, via pecuniary externalities, small regions can end up setting tax
rates above the taxes set by large regions.
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which is endowed with κ` units of capital. Regions only differ across the capital endow-
ments of their residents. Specifically, we assume that κr ≥ κp > 0, and henceforth refer
to region p and r as the “poor” and the “rich” region, respectively. Residents are immo-
bile, but capital is imperfectly mobile across regions: in the lines of Persson and Tabellini
(1992), a resident of a region that invests f units of capital in the other region incurs a mo-
bility cost f 2/2 in terms of utils. The national stock of capital is denoted by κ ≡ κp + κr,
and the ex ante level of heterogeneity in the economy is measured by ∆κ ≡ κr − κp.
The economy should be thought of as a federation with two levels of government,
namely, a central government, and two regional governments. Each level of government
is benevolent and chooses policies to maximize the utility of its resident over the four
periods. Residents are risk-neutral, do not discount future payoffs, and derive utility from
the consumption of two types of goods: a private good, and a local public good provided
by the regional government. The private good is the nume´raire and it is produced in
the last period by competitive firms. Capital is the only production input and units are
chosen so that one unit of capital produces one unit of the private good.
Local public goods, or “projects,” are binary in nature, i.e., they are either provided
at a predetermined scale or they are not provided (reasonable examples encompass large
infrastructure projects, such as bridges, roads, or tunnels). A project carries an initiation
cost c0 ≥ 1 in terms of the nume´raire, and with probability (1 − pi) ∈ [0, 1] requires
an additional cost c to be completed. The refinancing cost c not only incorporates the
technical cost of completion, but also other utility costs associated with the delay of the
project. If no refinancing is needed, a project launched in region ` yields social benefit b
within that region at the end of the initiation period. If refinancing is needed and met,
the project also yields b to the region, but once the economy ends. Otherwise, the social
benefit of the project is nil. We refer to (1−pi) as the probability of experiencing a negative
refinancing shock.
The refinancing cost c is distributed according to the probability density function h(c)
with full support on [0, b]. By construction, c ≤ b; otherwise, continuation would never be
optimal. The realizations of the refinancing shocks (i.e., whether projects are completed
or not at the end of the initiation period) are independent and observable across regions.
2.2 Tax Regimes
Regional governments have just enough resources to pay for the initiation cost c0. The
continuation cost c should be financed via tax revenues. We consider two institutional
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regimes, depending on which level of government makes the refinancing decision (if
needed) and funds the continuation cost. Under tax centralization, TC, the central gov-
ernment decides upon refinancing incomplete projects through a uniform tax τ on the
national stock of capital.11 Under tax decentralization, TD, continuation decisions are made
by regional governments. To refinance, local authorities use a per unit tax levied on capi-
tal invested in their regions at the rate τ`. We assume that the choice of the tax regime is
taken by a national Congress.
2.3 Timing
Decisions unfold as summarized in Figure 1. Given a preexisting level of regional het-
erogeneity (captured by ∆κ), the Congress chooses between tax centralization and tax
decentralization at the beginning of t = 0. At the end of that period, the refinancing
cost c (common across regions) is realized. Period t = 1 is also divided into two subperi-
ods: first, regional governments simultaneously decide whether or not to initiate projects,
and subsequently the refinancing shock is realized. With probability pi, projects generate
payoff b at the end of t = 1.
At t = 2, central or regional governments (depending on the institutional regime in
place) decide whether to shut down or continue projects in financing needs, and taxes are
set accordingly at t = 3. Once taxes are set, capital owners invest in the region(s) with the
highest net return(s), central or regional governments raise their taxes, production takes
place, and private consumption occurs. Projects which are completed late yield social
benefit b at the end of period t = 3.
It is worth highlighting that uncertainty around refinancing needs is unraveled se-
quentially: at the end t = 0 the size of the refinancing cost is realized, and at the end of
t = 1 the outcome of the refinancing shock materializes. This modeling choice generates
a realistic feature. Namely, that the Congress faces more uncertainty than local govern-
ments regarding the returns of local projects.
2.4 Welfare Criteria
The Congress chooses the tax regime that maximizes a measure of social welfare across
regions. Specifically, let WI`,t denote the equilibrium level of expected welfare of region
11Our formulation of tax centralization is equivalent to a framework in which accepting or not a central
bailout is an option for the regions. The reason is that accepting a bailout would be a dominant strategy.
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Figure 1: Timing in the model. Values in terminal nodes represent the benefit of the
project. i` = I (= NI) if region ` initiates (does not initiate the project). r` = R (= NR) if
region ` refinances (does not refinance the project).
` ∈ {p, r} at period t under the tax regime I ∈ {TC, TD}. The Congress at t = 0 chooses
the institutional regime I ∈ {TC, TD} that maximizes
UI0 =
α
2
WIr,0 +
(
1− α
2
)
WIp,0, (1)
where α ∈ [0, 1].
The social preference for redistribution towards the poor is inversely related to α. Two
values of this parameter will be of particular interest for our analysis. First, under α = 1,
the Congress is utilitarian and, given risk neutrality, is only concerned about efficiency.
Second, α = 0 gives rise to a Rawlsian Congress which only values the welfare of the poor
region in the federation.
3 Tax Centralization
This section studies the outcomes and inefficiencies of the centralized tax regime. We start
by analyzing the decisions of the central government in the last two periods, i.e., when the
central government decides upon marginally financing local projects via uniform capital
taxes. Given that central taxation is non-distortionary (because taxation is uniform and
moving capital is costly), and that c ≤ b, at t = 2 the central government will fund all
projects in refinancing needs, henceforth denoted by n ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Therefore, in the last
period the central government sets a uniform tax τ(n) so that τ(n)κ = nc.
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Since taxation is uniform, the project initiation decision of a given region may ulti-
mately impact the welfare of the other region in the federation. Thus, when making the
project initiation choice at t = 1, a simultaneous game between regions arises. Region `’s
expected welfare at the beginning of t = 1 is given by
WTC`,1 (i`, im) = κ` (1−Enτ(n)) + 1I{i`=I}[b− c0], (2)
where En is the expectation over n, im is the investment decision chosen by region m 6= `,
and 1I{i`=I} is an indicator function which equals 1 if region ` has initiated the project.
Using that
Enτ(n) =
c
κ
(1− pi)
(
1I{i`=I} + 1I{im=I}
)
,
equation (2) can be written as
WTC`,1 (i`, im) = κ` + 1I{i`=I}
[
b− c0 − (1− pi)κ`
κ
c
]
− 1I{im=I}(1− pi)
κ`
κ
c· (3)
By (3), we can define the refinancing cost threshold
cTC` (κ`,pi) ≡
κ
κ`
b− c0
1− pi , (4)
which makes region `’s net expected welfare from initiating a project equal to zero, given
the probability of a negative refinancing shock (1 − pi), and given regional capital κ`.
The following proposition characterizes the project initiation decision of the region, and
follows naturally from the definition of cTC` .
Proposition 1. Consider the project initiation game under TC. Given (c, κ`,pi), project initiation
takes place in region ` if and only if c ≤ cTC` (κ`,pi).
National taxation generates a common-pool fiscal externality:12 any given region is neg-
atively affected by the possibility of an incomplete project in the other region. The impact
of this externality across regions is asymmetric, due to differences in tax bases. That is, as
evident from (3), region ` only pays a fraction κ`/κ of the cost of refinancing any incom-
plete project. As a consequence, the rich region follows a tighter investment rule than the
poor, which is reflected by cTCr ≤ cTCp . Initiation equilibria is shown in Figure 2.
12See Wildasin (1997) and Goodspeed (2002).
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Figure 2: Initiation equilibria under TC.
3.1 Inefficiencies
To isolate the sources of inefficiencies emerging under tax centralization, we begin by
characterizing the outcomes of a “first best,” which serves as our benchmark for efficiency.
Suppose that each region fully internalizes the cost of refinancing an incomplete project,
and that it meets refinancing costs without generating distortions. Under this first best
scenario, region `’s expected welfare at t = 1 is given by
W∗`,1(i`) = κ` + 1I{i`=I} [b− c0 − (1− pi)c] ,
where we used that refinancing is always optimal under the first best. It follows that
region ` would initiate a project at t = 1 if and only if (c,pi) satisfy c ≤ c∗(pi), where
c∗(pi) ≡ b− c0
1− pi .
Clearly, c∗ ≤ cTC` for all (κ`,pi) and ` ∈ {p, r}. This fact combined with cTCr ≤ cTCp prove
the next corollary:
Corollary 1. Under TC, equilibrium outcomes can be inefficient for two reasons:
1. Both regions invest in equilibrium when it is inefficient to do so.
2. Only the poor region invests in equilibrium when it is inefficient to do so.
11
𝜋10
𝑐
𝑏
𝑐&'(
𝑐)'(
𝑐∗
𝑐+𝑏
Figure 3: Inefficiencies under TC.
Due to the common-pool fiscal externality, inefficiencies under TC involve two types of
overinvestment distortions. Such inefficiencies are shown in Figure 3. When the refinanc-
ing cost is relatively low, both regions initiate too many projects. When the refinancing
cost is relatively high, the rich region does not initiate: this way, the rich can, at least,
avoid the cost of refinancing a large fraction of its own potential bailout. Investment in-
efficiencies require that pi be sufficiently low; if pi ≥ c0/b, TC replicates the first best for
all c.
We should also note that when κr → ∞, cTCr → c∗, and initiation decisions become
efficient for the rich. The reason is that, as the share of national capital in the hands of
the rich converges to one, this region fully internalizes the cost of its bailout for all (c,pi).
Conversely, initiation decisions become more distorted for the poor, because its share on
the cost of bailouts converges to zero.
4 Tax Decentralization
In this section we analyze the regime of tax decentralization. In this case, a three-stage
simultaneous game between regions emerges. At t = 1, regional governments take the
initial investment decision. At t = 2, the refinancing decision is made, given the realiza-
tion of the refinancing shocks. Finally, at t = 3, refinancing is achieved by levying taxes
on regional capital. Next we solve this game by backwards induction, and characterize
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the tax decentralization regime in terms of outcomes and inefficiencies.
4.1 Equilibrium in Tax Rates
Given a profile of regional tax rates (τp, τr), a resident of region ` ∈ {p, r} allocates her
capital endowment across regions by solving the following problem:
max
h`, f`m
h` (1− τ`) + f`m (1− τm)− 12( f`m)
2 (5)
subject to
h` + f`m = κ`, and f`m ≥ 0,
where h` is the level of capital invested in region `, and f`m is the capital flow from region
` to region m 6= `. It is straightforward to show that the solution to (5) gives
f`m = max{0, τ` − τm}, (6)
so that the size of capital flows across regions is being pinned down by the tax differential.
Based on (6), we can now characterize Nash equilibria of the tax determination subgame
in period t = 3.
Proposition 2. Consider the tax determination subgame under TD. Nash equilibria are as fol-
lows:
1. If only region ` refinances an incomplete project, it sets the tax rate τˆ I` ≡ 12
[
κ` −
√
κ2` − 4c
]
.
2. If both regions refinance incomplete projects, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies (τˆ I Ip , τˆ I Ir ) is such that τˆ I Ir < τˆ I Ip .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Figure 4 illustrates the possible equilibria in tax rates, depending on the profile of
refinancing decisions across regions. In this plot, we use that the reaction function of
region ` when seeking refinancing is given by
τ`(τm) =
1
2
[
κ` + τm −
√
(κ` + τm)
2 − 4c
]
, (7)
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Figure 4: Equilibrium in tax rates. If only region ` ∈ {p, r} refinances, it sets the tax rate
τˆ I` . If both regions refinance, they set (τˆ
I I
p , τˆ I Ir ) in equilibrium.
which is continuous, convex, and strictly decreasing, implying that local taxes are strate-
gic substitutes (see Appendix A.1).13 If only region ` is refinancing an incomplete project,
then τm = 0 on the right hand side of (7), and this yields τˆ I` . If both regions are seek-
ing funds to refinance incomplete projects, they engage in tax competition, and the rich
region sets a lower tax rate in equilibrium than the poor.
The intuition behind τˆ I Ir < τˆ I Ip is as follows. Suppose we abstracted from capital
mobility. Then the rich region could meet any predetermined revenue requirement by
levying lower tax rates than poor, due to its larger tax base (i.e., because κr > κp). Al-
lowing for capital mobility only reinforces this effect on tax differentials. The reason is
that capital flows from the poor to the rich in search for the highest after-tax yield, which
exacerbates the disparities in tax bases.
This mechanism formalizes the verbal description of Prud’homme (1995) quoted in the
introduction. Interestingly, the form of tax asymmetry in our model differs from the one
emerging in Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991), where the poor end up setting lower
taxes than the rich. The difference comes from the fact that, unlike in those environments,
in our model public expenditures do not adjust residually: both regions need to raise tax
revenues in the amount c, which is fixed at t = 3.
It is also worth highlighting that taxation is asymmetric in both of the cases described
13Parchet (2018), for example, finds empirical evidence supporting strategic substitutability in local tax
rates in Switzerland.
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in Proposition 2. As a consequence, refinancing under the TD regime always triggers
capital mobility costs and, hence, carries deadweight losses. The magnitude of these
deadweight losses will be an essential determinant of the refinancing decisions described
in the next subsection.
4.2 Refinancing
Let WTD`,2 (r`, rm) denote region `’s welfare at t = 2 if the region initiated a project, given
refinancing decisions (r`, rm) ∈ {R, NR}2. R and NR denote “refinancing” and “not re-
financing”, respectively, and m 6= `. Using the results from the previous section, and
applying the local government’s budget constraint, we can write WTD`,2 (R, NR) as
WTD`,2 (R, NR) = κ` − c0 + b− RCI`(c),
where
RCI`(c) ≡ c +
1
2
(
fˆ I`m
)2
,
and fˆ I`m = τˆ
I
` is the equilibrium level of capital outflows from ` to m. RC
I
`(c) is region
`’s welfare cost of refinancing when the other region is not refinancing. This welfare cost
comprises the continuation cost c, and the deadweight loss from funding the continuation
of the project through distortionary taxation due to capital mobility.
Similarly, if both regions refinance we have
WTD`,2 (R, R) = κ` − c0 + b− RCI I` (c),
with
RCI I` (c) ≡ c− τˆ` fˆ I Im` + τˆm fˆ I I`m +
1
2
(
fˆ I I`m
)2
denoting region `’s welfare cost of refinancing when both regions choose to continue in-
complete projects, and where fˆ I I`m ( fˆ
I I
m`) are the equilibrium capital outflows (inflows) from
(to) region `. Capital inflows fˆ I Im` decrease the welfare cost of refinancing by alleviating
the tax burden on local residents. Capital outflows fˆ I I`m raise RC
I I
` (c) in two ways: they
increase the tax due in region m, and they trigger capital mobility costs.14
To characterize the equilibrium of the refinancing subgame, it will be useful to define
14To simplify notation, we leave implicit the dependency of RCI` and RC
I I
` on (κ`, κm).
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the cost thresholds ci` by
RCi`(c
i
`) = b,
for ` ∈ {p, r} and i = {I, I I}.15 In words, ci` is the continuation cost that makes region
` indifferent between refinancing and not refinancing an incomplete project, whenever i
regions refinance (including region `).
The fact that the rich region is endowed with a larger tax base implies that cir > cip,
so that the rich follows a looser criterion for refinancing projects, all else equal. More-
over, in the Appendix we prove that there exists a threshold κre f such that cIr ≤ cI Ip when
κr ≤ κre f , and cIr > cI Ip otherwise. Based on these relationships, we can show that when
initial regional disparities are large enough, the rich region refinances more projects in
equilibrium than the poor.
Proposition 3. Consider the refinancing subgame under TD. Nash equilibria are as follows:
1. Suppose that only region ` is facing an incomplete project. Then region ` refinances if and
only if c ≤ cI`.
2. Suppose that both regions face incomplete projects, and κr ≤ κre f . Then both regions refi-
nance if c ≤ cI Ip , and no region refinances otherwise.
3. Suppose that both regions face incomplete projects, and κr > κre f . Then both regions refi-
nance if c ≤ cI Ip , only region r refinances if cI Ip < c ≤ cIr , and no region refinances otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Nash equilibria of the refinancing subgame depend upon the capital endowment κr
and on the refinancing cost c. Part 1 is almost immediate, given the definition of cI`.
Now suppose that both regions face incomplete projects. When κr ≤ κre f , the difference
in capital endowments is relatively small, and both regions refinance their incomplete
project with fairly similar tax rates. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium is symmetric:
either both regions refinance their incomplete project, or no region does. However, when
κr > κre f , region r has a much larger tax base than the poor. So for moderate levels of
the refinancing cost, Nash equilibria become asymmetric. Specifically, not refinancing is
a dominant strategy for region p, while the opposite holds for region r.
15The existence of ci` follows by continuity and monotonicity of RC
i
`(c).
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4.3 Project Initiation
We now turn to discussing the project initiation decision under TD.
Proposition 4. Consider the project initiation game under TD. Given (c, κr,pi), there exists a
threshold cTD` (κr,pi) such that region ` ∈ {p, r} initiates a project if an only if c ≤ cTD` (κr,pi).
Moreover, there exists a cutoff κinit < κre f such that if κr ≤ κinit, cTDp (κr,pi) = cTDr (κr,pi) for
all pi, and cTDp (κr,pi) ≤ cTDr (κr,pi) otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Figure 5 summarizes project initiation as well as refinancing equilibria (characterized
in Proposition 3) under the TD regime given (c, κr,pi). Naturally, initiation becomes more
attractive for low c and high pi. For low values of κr, initiation equilibria is symmetric,
and both regions either initiate or do not initiate projects. When κr is above κinit, initiation
equilibrium can be asymmetric for intermediate values of c and pi. In that parametric
area—highlighted in the second panel of Figure 5—the rich region initiates but the poor
region does not, which overturns the project initiation outcome under the TC regime (refer
to Figure 3). Essentially, due to uniform national taxation, under TC differences in capital
endowments imply that the rich faces a higher refinancing cost than the poor. With TD,
on the other, the rich can exploit its larger tax base to its own advantage by lowering
taxes. As a consequence, the expected cost of initiating a project is lower (higher) for the
rich (poor) under TD than under TC.
In the the second row of Figure 5, κr exceeds κre f . For those values of κr, not only initi-
ation but also refinancing outcomes can be asymmetric for any realization of refinancing
shocks. This occurs for c ∈ [cI Ip , cIr ], as explained in Proposition 3.
4.4 Inefficiencies
To close this section, we study inefficiencies arising from the TC regime. Our efficiency
benchmark is still the first best introduced in Section 3.1. In the Appendix we show that,
for all (κr,pi), the initiation thresholds cTD` are below c
∗. Hence, we can establish the types
of inefficiencies that emerge under this institutional regime, as follows.
Corollary 2. Under TD, equilibrium outcomes can be inefficient for three reasons:
1. Regions do not make initial investments in equilibrium when it is efficient to do so.
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Figure 5: Initiation and refinancing equilibria under TD. Region ` ∈ {p, r} is said to
refinance “conditionally” when it refinances only if region m 6= ` faces an incomplete
project.
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2. Incomplete projects are not refinanced in equilibrium when it is efficient to do so.
3. Incomplete projects are refinanced using distortionary capital taxes.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Figure 6 illustrates these results. We only focus on scenarios in which κr ≤ κre f , as these
already comprise all possible types of inefficiencies. Consider the first panel, in which
κr ≤ κinit. To the northwest of c∗ efficient decisions are adopted in both regions, while
in all other areas inefficiencies arise. Particularly, regions underinvest for (c, κr,pi) such
that c ∈ [cTDp (κr,pi), c∗(pi)]. To the southeast of cTDp initiation is optimal, but refinancing
(if it occurs) is achieved bearing deadweight losses, as capital taxation is distortionary.
Moreover, for c > cIp, incomplete projects are either shut down in some terminal nodes
of the tax competition game, or they are never finished. The second panel of Figure 6
illustrates the case in which regional disparities are sufficiently large so that a new type
of initiation inefficiency appears: when (c, κr,pi) satisfy c ∈ [cTDp (κr,pi), cTDr (κr,pi)], only
the poor region underinvests.
In general, the higher the capital endowment differential, the lower the distortions in
region r. In fact, as κr → ∞, (τˆ Ir , τˆ I Ir ) → (0, 0) and cTDr → c∗, and both initiation and
refinancing decisions of the rich region converge to the first best ones. On the other hand,
when κr increases, τˆ I Ip increases and converges to the highest tax rate τˆ Ip. This implies that,
when both regions refinance, refinancing becomes costlier to region p. In turn, cTDp moves
towards the southeast of the (c,pi) plane, which amplifies underinvestment distortions
for region p.
5 Optimal Institutional Regime
The institutional choice between tax centralization and tax decentralization is made by
the Congress at t = 0, when the realization of the refinancing cost c is still unknown. As
a reminder, the Congress chooses I ∈ {TC, TD} by maximizing the welfare criterion UI0
in (1):
UI0 =
α
2
WIr,0 +
(
1− α
2
)
WIp,0,
with α ∈ [0, 1].
In this section we study how the optimal regime choice is shaped by the interplay of
three fundamentals: the difference in initial capital endowments across regions (indexed
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Figure 6: Inefficiencies under TD.
by κr), the social aversion to interregional inequalities (which is decreasing in α), and the
distribution of refinancing shocks (determined by pi). Until stated otherwise, we adopt
two parametric assumptions which permit an analytical characterization of the optimal
regime for different configurations of (κr, α,pi):
Assumption 1. The refinancing cost is uniformly distributed over [0, b].
Assumption 2. b−c0c0 ≥ 2.
Assumption 1 simplifies the algebra around welfare comparisons. Assumption 2 imposes
a lower bound on the profitability of the project, as measured by the net benefit-to-cost
ratio (before refinancing costs). Taken together, these are sufficient conditions to ensure a
single-crossing between UTC0 and U
TD
0 across pi ∈ [0, 1) given (κr, α).16 We first establish
how the regime comparison is determined by pi:
Proposition 5. Given (κr, α), there exists a unique threshold pˆi(κr, α) such that TD dominates if
and only if pi ≤ pˆi(κr, α).
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
16The existence of such single-crossing when violating Assumptions 1-2 has been verified extensively
though numerical simulations. In Section 6 we provide a sample of those simulations.
20
By Proposition 5, low pi favors TD over TC. Essentially, given a refinancing cost,
an increase in the probability of experiencing a negative refinancing shock (i.e., a reduc-
tion in pi) decreases the net expected return on the local project. As projects become less
profitable, overinvestment distortions under TC exacerbate, while underinvestment dis-
tortions under TD are dampened (see Corollaries 1 and 2). Hence, a reduction in pi lowers
the relative inefficiencies of TD.17
In the remainder of this section, we characterize the optimal regime across (κr, α) by
evaluating the behavior of the frontier pˆi(κr, α) when changing those fundamentals. We
proceed in two steps. First, we isolate the impact of changes in κr when α = 1, i.e., assum-
ing that the Congress follows a utilitarian criterion. Next, we generalize those results and
compare the relative performance of centralization and decentralization under different
welfare criteria.
5.1 A Utilitarian Congress
Consider the case of a purely utilitarian Congress, in which α = 1. In this environment,
the Congress is only guided by efficiency considerations. We begin by looking at how
initial disparities shape the regime comparison, conditional on regions being sufficiently
homogeneous.
Proposition 6. Suppose that κr is close to κp. Then the frontier pˆi(κr, 1) increases with κr .
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Verbally, small disparities favor tax decentralization vis-a´-vis centralization. Why? Con-
sider the centralized framework. By Assumption 2, the profitability of local projects is
high. If, in addition, κr is close to κp, the rich region would initiate all projects as its
share on the cost of bailouts is low (i.e., close to 1/2). Under TC the initiation rule is
looser for the poor (see Section 3) and, hence, both regions would initiate all projects.18
This situation would not change by increasing (κr− κp) slightly, and social welfare would
not be affected either (because only the regional shares on bailouts are changing and the
government is utilitarian).
17The result in the proposition extends one of the normative prescriptions in Bellofatto and Besfamille
(2018) to an environment with asymmetric regions. A key difference with that paper is that, in the current
environment, capital mobility distortions are present even when all regions need to refinance.
18Technically, under Assumption 2 and for κr = κp, we have cTCp = cTCr > b.
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Figure 7: The frontier pˆi(κr, 1).
Conversely, welfare in the decentralized regime does change for any variation in κr.
Two offsetting effects should be taken into consideration. First, under TD, the welfare cost
of the tax distortions arising when both regions refinance an incomplete project increases.
This is because (τˆ I Ip − τˆ I Ir ) rises with κr. Second, the distortions arising if only region r
refinances decrease, since τˆ Ir is a decreasing function of κr. In a neighborhood of κr = κp
this last effect dominates and, therefore, welfare under TD increases.
We now compare tax regimes in highly unequal federations.
Proposition 7. Suppose that κr → ∞. Then TD can dominate TC (i.e., pˆi(κr, 1) > 0) if and
only if
lim
κr→∞
ˆ cTDp (κr,0)
0
[
b− c0 − RCIp(c)
]
h(c)dc > b− c0 − c. (8)
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
According to Proposition 7, when regions are too heterogeneous tax decentralization can
still dominate centralization. The necessary and sufficient condition for this result has an
intuitive meaning. The left hand side of (8) is the net benefit of initiated projects in the
poor region under TD when refinancing is a certain event (i.e., under pi = 0). The right
hand side is the corresponding net benefit under TC. As the former exceeds the latter, de-
centralization becomes beneficial for the poor region even under extreme disparities and
in the worst case scenario in which all projects should be refinanced. Notably, condition
(8) does not involve net benefits under either regime for the rich region. This is because
welfare of the rich converges to the first best level as κr → ∞, no matter what tax regime
is in place.
Propositions 6 and 7 portray how initial disparities shape the optimal tax regime (on
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efficiency grounds) in opposite sides of the spectrum of κr. Figure 7 illustrates these re-
sults. (As shown in Section 6 below, the shape of the frontier for intermediate values of κr
is in line with typical numerical simulations of the model.)
5.2 Equity Considerations
To facilitate the interpretation of the upcoming analysis, we first establish a precursory
result which illustrates how regional disparities are affected by each regime.
Lemma 1. Let DI0 ≡ WIr,0 −WIp,0 be the expected welfare disparity across regions under regime
I∈{TC, TD}. Then
DTC0 < κr − κp < DTD0 .
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
Lemma 1 shows that tax decentralization worsens regional disparities relative to central-
ization. This is intuitive, since under TC the rich region pays a higher fraction of central
bailouts. On the other hand, under TD it is more likely that capital flows from region p to
region r, thus widening the welfare differences between the rich and the poor. It is worth
noting that (κr − κp), the benchmark for comparing expected disparities in Lemma 1, can
be interpreted as the expected degree of regional disparities under autarky.19
The previous lemma allows us to show the following result:
Proposition 8. The frontier pˆi(κr, α) satisfies three properties:
1. It increases with α.
2. There exists a α such that for α ≥ α the frontier pˆi(κr, α) increases with κr in a neighborhood
of κr = κp.
3. There exists a threshold α such that for α > α we have limκr→∞ pˆi(κr, α) > 0 if and only if
(8) holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.9.
19Under autarky, capital is immobile because regions are isolated from each other. This implies that
local taxation is lump-sum. Moreover, as utilities are linear, regions follow the same decisions in terms of
initiation and refinancing public projects.
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Figure 8: The frontier pˆi(κr, α) for different values of α. pˆi(κp, α) is independent of α. As α
decreases, pˆi(κr, α) intersects the horizontal axis closer to the origin.
Using the definition of DI0 , we can write the welfare criterion in (1) as
UI0 =
1
2
WIr,0 +
1
2
WIp,0 −
1
2
(1− α)DI0 , (9)
so that (1− α) gauges the negative impact of expected disparities on social welfare, given
a surplus (WIr,0 +WIp,0). Part 1 of the proposition, by which TD dominance increases with
α, is then immediate from Lemma 1 and equation (9). Put differently, α < 1 creates a bias
towards TC dominance.
Parts 2 and 3 generalize our previous results of Propositions 6 and 7, respectively, on
the limiting behavior of the frontier pˆi. Naturally, the corresponding results on how TD
dominance changes with κr go through as long as the bias against TD (which is propor-
tional to (1− α)) is not too large. For high concerns for regional inequality, though, the
frontier decreases with κr, implying that higher regional disparities favor TC.20
5.2.1 A Rawlsian Congress
As shown previously, decentralization exacerbates initial disparities across regions which,
in turn, provides a case for centralization on equity grounds. Next, we evaluate the sever-
20In line with this normative prescription, Arzaghi and Henderson (2005), Stegarescu (2009) and Sacchi
and Salotti (2014) empirically find that high regional economic disparities negatively affect the level of
decentralization.
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ity of such a bias against decentralization. We do so by comparing regimes under Rawl-
sian social preferences, i.e., by only weighting the welfare of the poor region.
Proposition 9. Suppose that α = 0 and that κr is sufficiently low. Then pˆi(κr, 0) > 0, so that
there exist combinations of (κr,pi) such that TD strictly dominates TC.
Proof. See Appendix A.10.
Figure 8 summarizes the results of Propositions 8 and 9 on how the frontier pi(κr, α)
changes with the normative parameter α. Even when α = 0, the Congress chooses TD in a
non-empty parametric area of the plane (κr,pi). This result is surprising: even a Congress
who is extremely averse to inequality would choose the decentralization regime which
widens disparities the most.21
As shown in the south west of Figure 8, TD is optimal under Rawlsian preferences
when both (κr − κp) and pi are small. To elucidate the underlying mechanism, we only
need to compare the relative efficiency of each regime for the poor region—this is the only
jurisdiction with positive weight when α = 0. Consider the TC regime first. If pi is small,
the net expected return on a project is tiny. Moreover, if regions are sufficiently homoge-
neous, the poor needs to fund a large share of the bailouts from the central government
(close to 1/2). Overall, the poor faces acute overinvestment inefficiencies under TC in the
south west of Figure 8.
Decentralization essentially protects the poor against its own incentives to overinvest,
at the cost of generating other distortions. In fact, under TD the poor underinvests rela-
tive to the first best, and taxes in a distortionary fashion, given that τp > τr in equilibrium
(regardless of the refinancing outcome). But these inefficiencies are not too severe when
the probability pi is low, and when κr is close to κp: for those parameters, projects are not
too profitable, and in equilibrium τp is closer to τr. In sum, the distortions faced by the
poor under TD are smaller than those under TC.
6 Numerical Illustration
In this section we complement our previous analytical results with numerical simula-
tions. Our main goal is twofold: to verify the robustness of our results, and to look at
comparative statics with respect to some key parameters.
21It is worth emphasizing that taxation is uniform under TC, and that the Congress abides by this restric-
tion when choosing the decentralization regime.
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The baseline parameterization is as follows. We normalize κp to 1, set c0 = 0.01κp,
b = 4c0, and assume that the distribution of c is uniform (obviously, Assumptions 1-
2 hold for these parameter values). The maximum value of κr is 4κp, which is in line
with US data.22 The frontier pˆi(κr, α) corresponding to the baseline scenario is shown in
solid blue in Figures 9 and 10. In each figure, the first panel shows the frontier when the
Congress is Utilitarian (i.e., α = 1), while the second panel focuses on the Rawlsian case
with α = 0.
Figure 9 analyzes the impact on the frontier pˆi(κr, α) when relaxing Assumption 1, by
which the distribution of c is uniform (or, equivalently, a Beta(1, 1)). We numerically solve
the model under two additional distributions for the refinancing cost: a Beta(3, 1) and a
Beta(1, 3). The former is negatively skewed and concentrates much more mass on high
values for c than a uniform distribution. The opposite holds for the latter. In Figure 10 we
focus on the consequences of relaxing Assumption 2. We do so by bringing down the net
benefit-to-cost ratio (b− c0)/c0 below 2.
The numerical simulations yield, at least, two important lessons. First, and most im-
portantly, our analytical characterization of the optimal regime contained in Section 5 can
hold more generally under less restrictive parametric specifications.
Second, TD dominates in a larger parametric area as h(c) concentrates more mass on
high c, or as b decreases. Essentially, in either case the expected return on local projects
decreases. As a consequence, overinvestment distortions under TC become relatively
more severe than the underinvestment inefficiencies of TD.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the relative merits of tax decentralization in the face of regional
disparities. We build a model of a federation with two government layers, and two
regions differing across a mobile tax base, i.e., capital. We focus on whether tax pow-
ers should be transferred or not to the regional governments by comparing two polar
regimes on efficiency and on equity grounds. Under tax decentralization, local public
projects are entirely funded by the regional governments. Under tax centralization, local
public projects are partially funded by the central government via bailouts. Our model
formalizes the following trade-off: decentralization widens interregional heterogeneity
22In terms of capital stock per capita for 2007, the District of Columbia is the richest state while Mississippi
is the poorest state in the US. Their per capita capital stocks are 102,709 and 24,753 thousands of 2000 US
dollars, respectively. See Yamarik (2013) and US Census.
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Figure 9: Numerical simulations of the frontier pˆi(κr, α) for different density functions
h(c). κp is normalized to 1, c0 = 0.01κp, and b = 4c0.
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Figure 10: Numerical simulations of the frontier pˆi(κr, α) for different values of b. κp is
normalized to 1, c0 = 0.01κp, and h(c) is uniform.
and produces underinvestment inefficiencies (among other distortions), while centraliza-
tion dampens regional disparities and can lead to an inefficiently high level of provision
of local projects.
We find that: (i) small disparities can favor decentralization, (ii) large disparities do
not necessarily eliminate decentralization optimality, and (iii) while decentralization ex-
acerbates regional disparities, it can still be optimal under a Rawlsian constitution. The
title of the paper condenses these key findings.
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A number of extensions are left for further work. In particular, it would be interesting
to evaluate tax regimes from a long run perspective in an infinite horizon version of the
model, or to analyze the interaction of regional disparities with other forms of tax com-
petition (such as commodity taxation). One could also formalize the influence of larger
regions on the decisions of the central government within a political economy framework.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We start by proving equation (6), which pins down the direction of capital flows as a function of
regional taxes. Letting λ`m be the multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint in (5),
the first-order condition for f`m yields
τ` − τm + λ`m = f`m,
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along with the complementary slackness condition λ`m f`m = 0, λ`m ≥ 0. If τ` > τm, f`m > 0
and thus λ`m = 0. If τ` = τm, λ`m = f`m. In this case, the unique combination that satisfies the
complementary slackness condition is λ`m = f`m = 0. Finally, if τ` < τm, λ`m > 0 to ensure that
f`m ≥ 0. Hence, by complementary slackness f`m = 0. This shows (6).
We move on to characterizing the tax reaction functions. Welfare of a resident of region ` at
t = 3 when a project is refinanced is
WTD`,3 (τ`, τm) = (κ` − f`m) (1− τ`) + f`m (1− τm)−
1
2
( f`m)2 + b− c0.
By the Envelope Theorem, ∂WTD`,3 (τ`, τm)/∂τ` < 0. So to raise funds for refinancing, the regional
government of ` should set the lowest tax rate that satisfies its budget constraint
τ`(κ` − f`m + fm`) = c,
which using (6) can be written as
τ`(κ` + τm − τ`) = c. (A.1)
Hence, given τm, the local government of ` sets τ` equal to smallest root of (A.1), namely
τ`(τm) =
1
2
[
κ` + τm −
√
(κ` + τm)
2 − 4c
]
. (A.2)
This is region `’s tax reaction function when refinancing a project.23 Such function is continuous,
strictly decreasing and convex.
We close by characterizing Nash equilibria in tax rates. Case 1 of Proposition 2 is obvious by
inspection of (A.2). Now suppose that both regions seek refinancing, as per case 2 of the proposi-
tion. Define the function Γ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2, with
Γ(τp, τr) =
(
τr(τp), τp(τr)
)
.
This function is continuous, and maps a compact set into itself. Hence, by Brower’s Theorem, Γ
has at least one fixed point (τˆ I Ip , τˆ I Ir ), which is a Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game and
that satisfies
τˆ I Ip =
1
2
[
κp + τˆ
I I
r −
√(
κp + τˆ I Ir
)2 − 4c ] , and τˆ I Ir = 12
[
κr + τˆ
I I
p −
√(
κr + τˆ I Ip
)2 − 4c ] .
(A.3)
23Throughout the paper, we assume that κp > 3
√
b/2 and that b ≤ 1. These assumptions ensure that the
square root on the right hand side of (A.2) always exists and that all tax rates are always below 1.
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To prove uniqueness, we evaluate
φ(κp, κr) ≡ limτp→0
∂τr
∂τp
∣∣∣∣
τr(τp)
− limτr→0
∂τr
∂τp
∣∣∣∣
τp(τr)
=
1
2
− κr
2
√
κ2r − 4c
−
2
√
κ2p − 4c√
κ2p − 4c− κp
.
As κp > 3
√
b/2,
limκr→κpφ(κp, κr) =
(
κp − 3
√
κ2p − 4c
) (
κp +
√
κ2p − 4c
)
−2
√
κ2p − 4c
(
κp −
√
κ2p − 4c
) > 0,
and
∂φ(κp, κr)
∂κr
=
2c
(κ2r − 4c)
√
κ2r − 4c
> 0.
Hence, for any κr ≥ κp, φ(κp, κr) is strictly positive. Moreover, by convexity of the reaction func-
tions τp(τr) and τr(τp), at (τˆ I Ip , τˆ I Ir ) we have
∂τr(τˆ I Ip , τˆ I Ir )
∂τp
∣∣∣∣∣
τr(τp)
>
∂τr(τˆ I Ip , τˆ I Ir )
∂τp
∣∣∣∣∣
τp(τr)
.
Therefore, the reaction functions cross only once.
Finally, using a similar geometric argument, we can show that τˆ I Ip > τˆ I Ir . If this were not the
case, by convexity of the reaction functions, the 45◦ line would intersect τr(τp) to the northeast of
the corresponding intersection with τp(τr). But by (A.3), the intersections of the reactions func-
tions with the 45◦ line occur at τr = c/κr < τp = c/κp, yielding a contradiction.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of part 1 is immediate, so we focus on parts 2 and 3. We start by establishing an inter-
mediate result:
Lemma 2. There exists a threshold κre f such that cIr ≤ cI Ip when κr ≤ κre f , and cIr > cI Ip otherwise.
Proof. Consider how the threshold cIr changes with κr. First, limκr→κp cIr = cIp, as limκr→κp RC
I
r(c) =
RCIp(c). Second, cIr increases with κr. This is because τˆ Ir decreases with κr, so RCIr (c) decreases
with κr as well. Finally, limκr→∞ cIr = b, as limκr→∞ RCIr (c) = c.
Next we study how cI Ip evolves with κr. First, limκr→κp cI Ip = b. This follows by
limκr→κp RC
I I
p (c) = c,
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because when regions are symmetric, the Nash equilibrium (τˆ I Ip , τˆ I Ir ) is symmetric and thus no
deadweight loss emerges. Second, cI Ip decreases with κr, since τˆ I Ip (τˆ I Ir ) increases (decreases) with
κr, so RCI Ip (c) increases with κr. Lastly, when κr → ∞, the Nash equilibrium (τˆ I Ip , τˆ I Ir ) → (τˆ Ip, 0).
Hence,
limκr→∞RC
I I
p (c) = RC
I
p(c)
and limκr→∞cI Ip = cIp.
By Bolzano’s theorem, the properties above imply that the continuous function g(κr) ≡ cIr(κr)−
cI Ip (κr) is increasing in κr, and has a unique root denoted by κre f .
Suppose that both regions face incomplete project and that κr ≤ κre f . If c ≤ cIp, refinancing is
a dominant strategy for both regions because b− RCI I` (c) > b− RCI`(c) ≥ 0. Now let cI Ip < c ≤
b. In this case, not refinancing is a dominant strategy for region p by definition of cI Ip , and not
refinancing is also a best response for region r since
WTDr,2 (R, NR) = κr − c0 + b− RCIr (c) ≤ κr − c0 = WTDr,2 (NR, NR).
Hence, no region refinances at the Nash equilibrium. When cIp < c ≤ cIr , refinancing is a dominant
strategy for region r while, for region p,
WTDp,2 (R, R) = κp − c0 + b− RCI Ip (c) ≥ κp − c0 = WTDp,2 (NR, R),
so that both regions refinance at the Nash equilibrium. Finally, assume that cIr < c ≤ cI Ip . Notice
that
WTDp,2 (R, R) = κp − c0 + b− RCI Ip (c) ≥ κp − c0 = WTDp,2 (NR, R),
but
WTDp,2 (R, NR) = κp − c0 + b− RCIp(c) < κp − c0 = WTDp,2 (NR, NR),
and similar conditions hold for region r. These payoffs give rise to a coordination game between
regions, with two Nash equilibria: either both regions refinance in equilibrium, or no region does.
We choose the first equilibrium because it is the only which is strong (Aumann (1959)), i.e., taking
as given the strategy of the other region, no coalition of players can jointly deviate and thus in-
crease the payoffs of each of its members. More specifically, by definition of the Nash equilibrium,
no region can do better by unilaterally changing its equilibrium strategy. Now consider the 2-
regions coalition. If both regions refinance, they do not want to deviate since b− RCI I` (c) ≥ 0. But,
when no region refinances, they all wish to deviate because both regions obtain a higher payoff in
the first Nash equilibrium.
To conclude, assume that both regions face incomplete project and κr > κre f . If 0 ≤ c ≤
cI Ip , both regions refinance at the equilibrium. On the other hand, when cIr < c ≤ b, no region
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refinances at the Nash equilibrium. Finally, suppose that cI Ip < c ≤ cIr . Now, not refinancing is a
dominant strategy for region p, while refinancing is a dominant strategy for region r.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The equilibria of the initiation game is affected by the configuration of (c, κr,pi). In what follows
we stratify this parametric area to analyze all possible equilibria. Throughout this proof we as-
sume that κr ≤ κre f , which implies that the refinancing equilibrium if both regions face incomplete
projects is always symmetric (see Proposition 3).24 It will be convenient to divide the resulting
parametric area into three regions:
1. pi > c0/b, for all c and κr ≤ κre f .
2. pi ≤ c0/b, c < cIp, for all κr ≤ κre f .
3. pi ≤ c0/b, c ≥ cIp, for all κr ≤ κre f .
In the interest of space, we only fully characterize the equilibrium of the initiation subgame for
cases 1 and 2. In case 1, initiating is clearly a dominant strategy for either region. We next analyze
case 2, in which refinancing is a dominant strategy for both regions as c < cIp.
Let i` ∈ {I, NI} denote the initiation decision of region `, where I and NI denote “initiation”
and ”no initiation”, respectively, and let WTD`,1 (i`, im) denote expected welfare of region `, given the
profile of initiation choices (i`, im) with m 6= `. Suppose im = NI. Then i` = I is a best response if
and only if
WTD`,1 (I, NI) = κ` − c0 + b− (1− pi)RCI`(c) ≥ κ`.
Define the threshold c˜I` satisfying
(1− pi)RCI`(c˜I`) = b− c0.
By definition, initiating is a best response of ` when region m does not initiate if and only if
(c, κr,pi) satisfies c ≤ c˜I`.25 Similarly, initiating is a best response if the other region initiates if
and only if
WTD`,1 (I, I) = κ` − c0 + b− (1− pi)
[
piRCI`(c) + (1− pi)RCI I` (c)
]
≥ κr.
This condition boils down to c ≤ c˜I I` , where c˜I I` is defined by
(1− pi)
[
piRCI`(c˜
I I
` ) + (1− pi)RCI I` (c˜I I` )
]
= b− c0.
24The proof for κr > κre f is analogous.
25The dependency of c˜I` on (κr,pi) is left implicit to simplify notation.
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Lemma 3. Given (pi, κr), the thresholds c˜
j
` satisfy:
a) c˜jp < c˜
j
r for all j ∈ {I, I I}.
b) c˜I` < c˜
I I
` for all ` ∈ {p, r}.
c) There exists a threshold κinit such that c˜Ir ≤ c˜I Ip for κr ≤ κinit, and c˜Ir > c˜I Ip otherwise.
Proof. Part a) follows from the fact that RCir(c) < RCip(c) for all (c, κr,pi). Part b) holds because
RCI I` (c) < RC
I
`(c) for all (c, κr,pi). We now turn to part c). In Appendix A.2 we’ve shown that
RCIr (c) decreases with κr, and RCI Ip (c) increases with κr. In addition, RCIp(c) is independent of κr.
These properties imply that c˜Ir increases with κr, and c˜I Ip decreases with κr. Moreover, using the
definition of these cost thresholds we can show that limκr→κp
(
c˜I Ip − c˜Ir
)
> 0. Part c) then follows
by continuity of the cost thresholds in κr.
By Lemma 3, given (c,pi) we should analyze the equilibrium of the initiation game within two
subcases, according on the value of κr. Suppose initially that κr ≤ κinit.26 According to the lemma,
the thresholds c˜j` satisfy:
c˜Ip < c˜
I
r ≤ c˜I Ip .
Depending on where c falls in this inequality, four possibilities emerge:
(i) If c ≤ c˜Ip, initiating is a dominant strategy for both regions.
(ii) If c ∈ (c˜Ip, c˜Ir ], initiating is a dominant strategy for the rich. The best response for the poor is
to initiate as well. Hence (I, I) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
(iii) If c ∈ (c˜Ir , c˜I Ip ], two Nash equilibria emerge: either both regions initiate, or no region does.
We select the first equilibrium, as it is the only one which is strong.
(iv) If c > c˜I Ip , the unique Nash equilibria is (NI, NI).
Now suppose that κr > κinit, so that initiation thresholds satisfy
c˜Ip < c˜
I I
p < c˜
I
r .
Under this scenario we have:
(i) If c ≤ c˜I Ip , the unique Nash equilibrium is (I, I).
(ii) If c ∈ (c˜I Ip , c˜Ir ], not initiating is dominant for the poor, but initiating is dominant for the rich.
Then the unique Nash equilibrium is asymmetric.
26It is straightforward to verify that κinit < κre f .
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Figure A.1: Project initiation thresholds under TD when κr ≤ κre f .
(iii) If c > c˜Ir , the unique Nash equilibria is (NI, NI).
This concludes our analysis of case 2 above, i.e., when pi ≤ c0/b and c < cIp. To summarize, both
regions initiate when (c,pi) is such that c < c˜I Ip ; neither region initiates when (c,pi) satisfies c > c˜Ir ;
the rich initiates and the poor does not when (c,pi) is such that c ∈ [c˜I Ip , c˜Ir ], which only occurs
whenever κ > κinit.
The analysis of case 3, namely pi ≤ c0/b, c ≥ cIp, follows similar steps. Under that scenario, the
relevant initiation thresholds are given by (c¯Ir , c¯I Ip ), which are defined by
(1− pi)RCIr (c¯Ir) = b− c0, and (1− pi)
[
pib + (1− pi)RCI Ip (c¯I Ip )
]
= b− c0.
Then it can be shown that both regions initiate if c < c¯I Ip ; neither region initiates when if c > c¯Ir ;
the rich initiates and the poor does not if c ∈ [c¯I Ip , c¯Ir ].
Figure A.1 summarizes the analysis of cases 1-3. The pi-thresholds defined in that figure allow
us to define
cTDp =

c˜I Ip if pi ∈ [0,piTD1 ],
c¯I Ip if pi ∈ (piTD1 , c0/b],
b if pi ∈ (c0/b, 1],
36
for all κr, cTDr = cTDp for κr ≤ κinit, and
cTDr =

c˜I Ip if pi ∈ [0,piTD2 ],
c˜Ir if pi ∈ (piTD2 ,piTD3 ],
c¯Ir if pi ∈ (piTD3 ,piTD4 ],
c¯I Ip if pi ∈ (piTD4 , c0/b],
b if pi ∈ (c0/b, 1],
for κr > κinit. This completes the proof.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 2
Parts 2 and 3 are immediate, so we focus on part 1. To show that regions may underinvest under
TD it suffices to prove that cTD` < c
∗ for ` ∈ {p, r}. This follows by applying the definitions of
cTD` and c
∗, and using that RCI` is a strictly increasing and convex function of c, and that RC
I I
p is a
strictly increasing function of c.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
We break down the proof into two cases: finite κr and κr → ∞. Throughout the proof we use
the fact that UI0 are continuous and (almost everywhere) differentiable functions of pi for I ∈
{TC, TD}, and we explicitize the dependency of such functions on (κr,pi, α).
A.5.1 Finite κr
We proceed by characterizing the optimal regime for different values of pi. First, it is clear that
if pi = 1 both regimes are equivalent. Second, suppose pi ∈ [c0/b, 1). For this range of pi, it is
straightforward to show that
UTC0 (κr,pi, α) =
1
2
[
ακr + (2− α)κp
]
+ b− c0 − (1− pi)
[
α
κr
κ
+ (2− α)κp
κ
]
c. (A.4)
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Also:
UTD0 (κr,pi, α) =
1
2
[
ακr + (2− α)κp
]
+ b− c0 − α2
[ ˆ cIr
0
∆r(c, κr,pi)h(c)dc
+ (1− pi)
ˆ cI Ip
cIr
(
(1− pi)RC2r (c) + pib
)
h(c)dc + (1− pi)b
ˆ b
cI Ip
h(c)dc
]
− 2− α
2
[ ˆ cIp
0
∆p(c, κr,pi)h(c)dc + (1− pi)
ˆ cI Ip
cIp
(
(1− pi)RCI Ip (c) + pib
)
h(c)dc
+ (1− pi)b
ˆ b
cI Ip
h(c)dc
]
(A.5)
if κr ≤ κre f , and
UTD0 (κr,pi, α) =
1
2
[
ακr + (2− α)κp
]
+ b− c0 − α2
[ ˆ cI Ip
0
∆r(c, κr,pi)h(c)dc
+ (1− pi)
ˆ cIr
cI Ip
(
(1− pi)RC2r (c) + pib
)
h(c)dc + (1− pi)b
ˆ b
cIr
h(c)dc
]
− 2− α
2
[ ˆ cIp
0
∆p(c, κr,pi)h(c)dc + (1− pi)
ˆ cI Ip
cIp
(
(1− pi)RCI Ip (c) + pib
)
h(c)dc
+ (1− pi)b
ˆ b
cI Ip
h(c)dc
]
(A.6)
if κr > κre f , where
∆r(c, κr,pi) ≡ (1− pi)
[
piRCIr (c) + (1− pi)RCI Ir (c)
]
,
and
∆p(c, κr,pi) ≡ (1− pi)
[
piRCIp(c) + (1− pi)RC2r (c)
]
.
By (A.4)-(A.6), we have UTC0 (κr,pi, 1) > U
TD
0 (κr,pi, 1) (essentially, TC is fully efficient while TD
generates refinancing distortions). Moreover, it follows that
∂UTC0 (κr,pi, α)
∂α
<
∂UTD0 (κr,pi, α)
∂α
,
which implies that
UTC0 (κr,pi, α) > U
TD
0 (κr,pi, α) for all α ∈ [0, 1] if pi ≥ c0/b. (A.7)
For the rest of the proof, we compare equilibrium welfare under each regime when pi ∈ [0, c0/b).
It will be convenient to isolate different cases, depending on which regime dominates at pi = 0. In
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fact, based on the configuration of parameters, we may have27
UTD0 (κr, 0, α) > U
TC
0 (κr, 0, α), or U
TD
0 (κr, 0, α) ≤ UTC0 (κr, 0, α).
We next consider each subcase separately.
Subcase 1: UTD0 (κr, 0, α) > UTC0 (κr, 0, α). In this case, continuity and (A.7) imply that there
exist a threshold pˆi(κr, α) ∈ [0, c0/b) such that
UTD0 (κr, pˆi(κr, α), α) = U
TC
0 (κr, pˆi(κr, α), α). (A.8)
To prove uniqueness, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Suppose there exits a pˆi(κr, α) ∈ [0, c0/b) such that (A.8) holds, given (κr, α). Then
∂UTC0 (κr, pˆi(κr, α), α)
∂pi
≥ ∂U
TD
0 (κr, pˆi(κr, α), α)
∂pi
. (A.9)
In words, Lemma 4 shows that UTC0 is steeper than U
TD
0 if these functions cross at pˆi(κr, α) ∈
[0, c0/b). Uniqueness then follows immediately from the fact that social welfare functions are
continuous in pi. And, since UTD0 (κr, 0, α) > U
TC
0 (κr, 0, α), we get that TD dominates if and only if
(κr,pi, α) satisfy pi ≤ pˆi(κr, α).
It is not possible to show where does pˆi(κr, α) lie within the interval [0, c0/b). Hence, the full
proof to Lemma 4 is algebraically intensive as it requires to show (A.9) for all possible subintervals
of [0, c0/b) and for the whole range of (κr, α). For reasons of space, we only provide a sketch of
proof for the lemma by showing (A.9) for a particular case.
Proof of Lemma 4 (Sketch): Suppose that
κr ≤ min
{(
b
c0
− 1
)
κp, κinit
}
, (A.10)
and that
pˆi(κr, α) ∈ [0,piTD1 (κr)], (A.11)
where piTD1 was defined in Appendix A.3. Under TC, the region p initiates all projects because
by Assumption 2 we have cTCp (κr, 0) > b (see equation (4)). Similarly, region r also initiates all
27For example, when α = 1 and κr = κp, UTD0 (κr, 0, α) > U
TC
0 (κr, 0, α) because TD replicates the first best.
Applying a continuity argument, we know that this inequality should hold in a neighborhood of α = 1 and
κr = κp.
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projects given that cTCr (κr, 0) > b, by (A.10). As a consequence, we have
UTC0 (κr,pi, α) =
1
2
[
ακr + (2− α)κp
]
+ b− c0 − (1− pi)
[
α
κr
κ
+ (2− α)κp
κ
]
c
and
∂UTC0 (κr,pi, α)
∂pi
=
[
α
κr
κ
+ (2− α)κp
κ
]
c > 0, (A.12)
where c¯ is the expected value of c.
Now we compute the derivative of UTD0 with respect to pi. Given (A.10) and (A.11):
UTD0 (κr,pi, α) =
1
2
[
ακr + (2− α)κp
]
+
α
2
ˆ cTDp (κr ,pi)
0
[b− c0 − ∆r(c, κr,pi)] h(c)dc
+
2− α
2
ˆ cTDp (κr ,pi)
0
[
b− c0 − ∆p(c, κr,pi)
]
h(c)dc, (A.13)
This implies:
∂UTD0 (κr,pi, α)
∂pi
=− α
2
ˆ cTDp (κr ,pi)
0
∂∆r(c, κr,pi)
∂pi
h(c)dc
− 2− α
2
ˆ cTDp (κr ,pi)
0
∂∆p(c, κr,pi)
∂pi
h(c)dc
+
α
2
[
b− c0 − ∆r(cTDp (κr,pi), κr,pi)
]
h(cTDp (κr,pi))
∂cTDp (κr,pi)
∂pi
, (A.14)
where we used that ∆p(cTDp (κr,pi), κr,pi) = b− c0 by definition of cTDp (see Appendix A.3). Apply-
ing the definitions of ∆`(c, κr,pi) and (A.12), and evaluating (A.14) at pˆi(κr, α) we obtain
∂UTD0 (κr, pˆi, α)
∂pi
=
∂UTC0 (κr, pˆi, α)
∂pi
− (1− α)κr − κp
κ
c−
ˆ cTDp (κr ,pˆi)
0
α2
(
τˆ Ir
)2
2
+
2− α
2
(
τˆ Ip
)2
2
 h(c)dc
− 1
1− pˆi
ˆ b
cTDp (κr ,pˆi)
[2(b− c0)− (1− pˆi)c] h(c)dc
+
α
2
[
b− c0 − ∆r(cTDp (κr, pˆi), κr, pˆi)
]
h(cTDp (κr, pˆi))
∂cTDp (κr, pˆi)
∂pi
. (A.15)
By the Implicit Function Theorem,
∂cTDp (κr,pi)
∂pi
= −∂∆p(c, κr,pi)/∂pi
∂∆p(c, κr,pi)/∂c
<
2c∗(pi)− RCIp(c)
1− pi ,
where we used that ∂∆p(c, κr,pi)/∂pi = RCIp(c)− 2c∗(pi), and that ∂∆p(c, κr,pi)/∂c > 1−pi. Using
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this fact into (A.15) we get (after rearranging):
∂UTD0 (κr, pˆi, α)
∂pi
≤∂U
TC
0 (κr, pˆi, α)
∂pi
− (1− α)κr − κp
κ
c−
ˆ cTDp (κr ,pˆi)
0
α2
(
τˆ Ir
)2
2
+
2− α
2
(
τˆ Ip
)2
2
 h(c)dc
− 1
1− pˆi
{ ˆ b
cTDp (κr ,pˆi)
[2(b− c0)− (1− pˆi)c] h(c)dc
− α
[
b− c0 − ∆r(cTDp (κr, pˆi), κr, pˆi)
]
h(cTDp (κr, pˆi))
(
c∗(pˆi)− RC
I
p(cTDp (κr, pˆi))
2
)}
.
With some algebra we can show that, if Assumption 1 is satisfied, the term in curly brackets is
strictly positive. This implies that (A.9) holds under (A.10) and (A.11). We can similarly prove
that (A.9) is verified for all κr ∈ [0,∞), α ∈ [0, 1], and pˆi(κr, α) ∈ [0, c0/b).
Subcase 2: UTD0 (κr, 0, α) ≤ UTC0 (κr, 0, α). Here UTD0 and UTC0 cannot cross at any pi ∈ [0, c0/b).
If this were the case, UTD0 would intersect U
TC
0 from below along the pi dimension, thus contra-
dicting Lemma 4. In this case, we set pˆi(κr, α) = 0.
A.5.2 κr→ ∞
As in the previous section, we only focus on pi ≤ c0/b, since TC dominates otherwise, and both
regimes are equivalent for pi = 1. Let UI0 (∞,pi, α) ≡ limκr→∞ UI0 (κr,pi, α) for I ∈ {TC, TD}.
Using the results on the initiation and refinancing equilibria in each regime, we can show that:
UTC0 (∞,pi, α) =
1
2
[
ακr + (2− α)κp
]
+
α
2
[ c∗(pi)ˆ
0
(b− c0 − (1− pi)c) h(c)dc− (1− pi)c
]
+
2− α
2
(b− c0), (A.16)
and
UTD0 (∞,pi, α) =
1
2
[
ακr + (2− α)κp
]
+
α
2
c∗(pi)ˆ
0
(b− c0 − (1− pi)c) h(c)dc
+
2− α
2
cTDp (pi,∞)ˆ
0
(
b− c0 − (1− pi)RCIp(c)
)
h(c)dc, (A.17)
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where cTDp (∞,pi) ≡ limκr→∞ cTDp (κr,pi). Now let pi = 0 and define:
∇(α) ≡ UTD0 (∞, 0, α)−UTC0 (∞, 0, α) =
1
2
{
αc + (2− α)
[ˆ cTDp (∞,0)
0
[
b− c0 − RCIp(c)
]
h(c)dc− (b− c0)
]}
, (A.18)
where cTDp (∞, 0) ≡ limκr→∞ cTDp (κr, 0).
Suppose that ∇(α) > 0. Since welfare functions are continuous in pi, there exists a value
pˆi(∞, α) ∈ [0, c0/b) such that
UTC0 (∞, pˆi(∞, α), α)−UTD0 (∞, pˆi(∞, α), α) = 0,
At pˆi(∞, α), it follows from (A.16) and (A.17) that
∂UTC0 (∞, pˆi(∞, α), α)
∂pi
− ∂U
TD
0 (∞, pˆi(∞, α), α)
∂pi
=
1
2
[
αc− (2− α)
ˆ cTDp (∞,(pˆi(∞,α))
0
RCIp(c)h(c)dc
]
> 0. (A.19)
Hence, at pˆi(∞, α), UTC0 (∞,pi, α) is steeper than U
TD
0 (∞,pi, α). This implies that pˆi(∞, α) is unique,
by applying the same logic that we used in Section A.5.1.
Now suppose that∇(α) ≤ 0. It is straightforward to show that UTC0 (∞,pi, α) and UTD0 (∞,pi, α)
cannot intersect (or, equivalently, that pˆi(∞, α) = 0). If they did, (A.19) would be violated.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
We show a more general result for an arbitrary α ∈ [0, 1]. By the Implicit Function Theorem:
∂pˆi(κr, α)
∂κr
= −∂U
TD
0 (κr, pˆi, α)/∂κr − ∂UTC0 (κr, pˆi, α)/∂κr
∂UTD0 (κr, pˆi, α)/∂pi − ∂UTC0 (κr, pˆi, α)/∂pi
. (A.20)
The denominator is negative by Lemma 4. To sign the numerator, we need to consider all possible
expressions for UTD0 (κr,pi, α) across pi ∈ [0, c0/b) as it cannot be shown where pˆi(κr, α) lies within
that interval. While we have analyzed all possibilities, here we sign the numerator of (A.20) for a
particular case (the proof of the other cases is analogous and available upon request). So assume
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that pi ∈ [0,piTD1 (κr)]. Then
lim
κr→κp
[
∂UTD0 (κr, pˆi, α)/∂κr − ∂UTC0 (κr, pˆi, α)/∂κr
]
=
− (1− pi)
ˆ cTDp (κp,pi)
0
[
(1− α)(1− pi)τˆ I I
(
∂τˆ I Ip
∂κr
− ∂τˆ
I I
r
∂κr
)
+
α
2
pi τˆ Ip
∂τˆ Ir
∂κr
]
h(c)dc
− (1− pi)(1− α) c
2κp
(A.21)
where τˆ I I = limκr→κp τˆ I Ip = limκr→κp τˆ I Ir . Since
∂τˆ I Ir
∂κr
< 0 <
∂τˆ I Ip
∂κr
and ∂τˆ
I
r
∂κr
< 0, it follows that (A.21)
is strictly positive when α = 1 and strictly negative if α = 0. Moreover, as (A.21) monotonically
increases with α, Bolzano’s Theorem implies that there exists α such that, when α ≥ α, pˆi(κr, α)
increases with κr in a neighborhood of κr = κp.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
To prove the result we make use of the function ∇(α) defined in (A.18). Using cTDp (∞, 0) < b it
follows that ∂∂α∇(α) > 0. Moreover,
∇(0) =
ˆ cTDp (∞,0)
0
[
b− c0 − RCIp(c)
]
h(c)dc− (b− c0) < 0,
while
∇(1) = 1
2
{ˆ cTDp (∞,0)
0
[
b− c0 − RCIp(c)
]
h(c)dc− (b− c0 − c)
}
,
which is positive if and only if (8) holds. Since welfare functions are continuous in α, the above
implies that, under condition (8), there exists a threshold α such that∇(α) > 0 if and only if α > α.
If (8) is violated, ∇(α) ≤ 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1]. The statement of the proposition is obviously nested
by setting α = 1.
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A.8 Proof of Lemma 1
We start by deriving DTC0 . Let pi
TC
r and piTCp < piTCr be defined by cTCr (κr,piTCr ) = b and cTCp (piTCp ) =
b. Using these definitions, it follows that:
DTC0 (κr,pi) =

∆κ − 2(1− pi) κr−κpκ
´ cTCr
0 ch(c)dc
− ´ cTCp
cTCr
[
b− c0 + (1− pi) κr−κpκ c
]
h(c)dc if pi ∈ [0,piTCp ],
∆κ − (1− pi) κr−κpκ c−
´ cTCr
0
[
b− c0 + (1− pi) κr−κpκ c
]
h(c)dc if pi ∈ (piTCp ,piTCr ],
∆κ − 2(1− pi) κr−κpκ c if pi ∈ (piTCr , 1],
where ∆κ ≡ κr − κp. Clearly, we have DTC0 (κr,pi) < ∆κ for all (κr,pi).
We can similarly show that DTD0 (κr,pi) > ∆κ for all (κr,pi). This derivation is available upon
request, as there are many subcases of (κr,pi) to consider.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 8
Notably, ∂UI0 /∂α = DI0 , so using the Implicit Function Theorem we get:
∂pˆi(κr, α)
∂α
=
DTD0 (κr, pˆi)− DTC0 (κr, pˆi)
∂UTC0 (κr, pˆi, α)/∂pi − ∂UTD0 (κr, pˆi, α)/∂pi
, (A.22)
which, given Lemmas 1 and 4 is positive. This shows part 1. Parts 2 and 3 have been shown in
Appendices A.6 and A.7, respectively.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 9
If α = 0, UI0 (κr,pi, 0) = WIp,0(κr,pi) for I ∈ {TC, TD}. Suppose that pi = 0 and κr = κp. Under
Assumption 2 we get that
WTDp,0 (κp, 0) = κp +
b−c0ˆ
0
[b− c0 − c] h(c)dc > κp + b− c0 − c = WTCp,0 (κp, 0),
because under TD, only projects with positive benefit are initiated by region p, whereas all projects
(even those with negative net benefit) are initiated under TC by region p. On the other hand, if
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κr → ∞, then
lim
κr→∞
WTDp,0 (κr, 0) = κp +
cTDp (∞,0)ˆ
0
[
b− c0 − RCIp(c)
]
h(c)dc < κp + b− c0 = lim
κr→∞
WTCp,0 (κr, 0),
where the last equality follows from (A.16) evaluated at α = 0. Then, by continuity, there exists
a threshold κr > κp satisfying WTDp,0 (κr, 0) = W
TC
p,0 (κr, 0), such that TD dominates whenever κp ≤
κr ≤ κr.
Put differently, pˆi(κr, 0) crosses the κr-axis at κr. In addition, the frontier pˆi(κr, α) also intersects
the pi-axis at a strictly positive value of pi which is independent of α. We conclude that there exists
a non-empty parametric area in the (κr,pi) plane such that TD dominates when α = 0.
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